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Strategic Judging Under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political
Theory and Evidence
Max M. Schanzenbach and Emerson Tiller
Abstract
We present a positive political theory of criminal sentencing and test it using data
from the United States Sentencing Commission. The theory posits that, faced with
appellate review, federal district court judges applying the Sentencing Guidelines
strategically use “sentencing instruments” – fact-based and law-based determi-
nations made during the sentencing phase – to maximize the judges’ sentenc-
ing preferences subject to the Guideline’s constraints. Specifically, district court
judges are more likely to use law-based departures when they share the same party
ideology with the overseeing circuit court than when there is no party alignment
between the two courts. Fact-based adjustments, on the other hand, are routinely
used to maximize sentencing preferences regardless of party alignment between
the two courts. Our regression analyses suggest that the theory is largely sup-
ported. We find that: (1) Democrat appointees generally gave lower prison sen-
tences relative to Republican appointees for crimes of violence, theft and drug-
trafficking and (2) sentencing instruments were selectively used to raise or lower
the prison sentence based on the political ideology of the judge, the type of crime,
and whether there was political alignment between the district and circuit court.
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 We present a positive political theory of criminal sentencing and test it using data 
from the United States Sentencing Commission.  The theory posits that, faced with 
appellate review, federal district court judges applying the Sentencing Guidelines 
strategically use "sentencing instruments" -- fact-based and law-based determinations 
made during the sentencing phase -- to maximize the judges' sentencing preferences 
subject to the Guideline’s constraints.  Specifically, district court judges are more likely 
to use law-based departures when they share the same party ideology with the overseeing 
circuit court than when there is no party alignment between the two courts.  Fact-based 
adjustments, on the other hand, are routinely used to maximize sentencing preferences 
regardless of party alignment between the two courts. Our regression analyses suggest 
that the theory is largely supported.  We find that: (1) Democrat appointees generally 
gave lower prison sentences relative to Republican appointees for crimes of violence, 
theft and drug-trafficking and (2) sentencing instruments were selectively used to raise or 
lower the prison sentence based on the political ideology of the judge, the type of crime, 
and whether there was political alignment between the district and circuit court.  
 2
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art1
May 23, 2005 
 
 
Positive political theories of judging suggest that much of the policy discretion 
exercised by judges is guided by political ideology, constrained by institutional 
competition between lower and higher courts, and exercised through a variety of legal 
decision instruments available to judges when deciding cases.  Judges are modeled as 
strategic policy makers who routinely manipulate doctrines, procedures, and other 
decision instruments to advance their preferred policies when faced with higher courts 
who may have competing policy preferences.1  In this paper, we examine how judicial 
discretion in sentencing has played out; in particular, we examine whether the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines2 have been applied strategically by judges to affect 
sentencing outcomes, how they are so used, and what constraints exist on such discretion.  
Criminal sentencing should be especially amenable to positive political analyses given 
the conventional beliefs that liberals and conservatives widely differ on how “tough” the 
criminal justice system should be on criminals and the complex and manipulable set of 
sentencing rules and standards embodied in the Sentencing Guidelines.  
We construct an "instrument choice" positive political theory of criminal 
sentencing and test it empirically with sentencing data from the United States Sentencing 
                                                 
*Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law, 357 E. Chicago Ave; Chicago, IL 
60611; m-schanzenbach@law.northwestern.edu.  Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of 
Law, tiller@law.northwestern.edu.  The authors thank participants in seminars at the University of Chicago  
Law School; Washington University in St. Louis; Haas School of Business UC-Berkeley; Northwestern 
University School of Law; Columbia University School of Law; and Tel Aviv School of Law.  We also 
thank James Zafris for helpful insights.
1 For recent Positive Political Theory models focusing on selection of decision instruments, see Pablo T. 
Spiller & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 8 (1992); Emerson 
H. Tiller, "Controlling Policy by Controlling Process: Judicial Influence on Regulatory Decision Making," 
14 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 114-135 (April 1998); Emerson H. Tiller & Pablo T. 
Spiller, Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political Games in Administrative Law, 15 J. L. ECON. 
& ORG. 349 (1999).   For empirical support, see Joseph L. Smith and Emerson H. Tiller, “The Strategy of 
Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law,” 31 Journal of Legal Studies 61 (2002). 
2 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, 18 U.S.C. 
(2000) [hereinafter, U.S.S.G.]. 
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Commission.  The theory suggests that, when determining prison time for a convicted 
felon, federal district court judges (1) are influenced by their political ideologies in 
setting prison length; (2) manipulate the rules and structure of the Sentencing Guidelines 
to the extent possible; and (3) make choices in anticipation of the likely response of the 
overseeing circuit court of appeals.   
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, judges can alter the sentencing range for a 
convicted defendant through factual and legal determinations at the sentencing hearing 
(post-conviction or post-plea).  The fact-based determinations relate to aggravating and 
mitigating factors and can lead to adjustments to the numeric base offense level 
(determined by the crime of conviction) which, in combination with a defendant's 
criminal history, ultimately sets the acceptable sentencing range.  These adjustments are 
reviewed by the circuit courts of appeal with great deference to the district court's factual 
conclusions. 
There is, of course, a limit to the number of adjustments that can be made in a 
given case, but judges may choose to “depart” from the Guidelines’ range.  This 
determination requires significant legal conclusions in addition to factual findings.  The 
sentencing judge must hold that (1) the Sentencing Commission has neither proscribed 
nor considered this category of circumstances when it created the Sentencing Guidelines, 
and (2) the factual circumstances are sufficiently unusual that the Sentencing Guidelines 
ranges should not apply.  This law-based conclusion allows the district court judge to 
make a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines, thereby leading to significant 
enhancements or reductions to the felon's calculated sentence.  These departures, which 
are generally discouraged by the Guidelines, are reviewed by the circuit courts with much 
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less deference than that given to offense level adjustments; consequently, law-based 
departures carry greater risk for a sentencing judge in terms of review and reversal by 
higher courts.   
  Adding ideology and institutional competition between lower and higher courts 
to the mix, the theory suggests that when the lower and higher courts are politically 
aligned, the sentencing judge has the ability to use in a cumulative manner both fact-
based adjustments and law-based departures to set the defendant’s sentence to the term 
most preferred by the judge with less concern about reversal by the overseeing circuit 
court.  When the lower and higher court are not so aligned, however, the risk of reversal 
increases.  In that situation the district court judge relies less on law-based departures 
because they invite greater scrutiny by the overseeing circuit court.  
The empirical test of our theory suggests that, as predicted: (1) ideology matters 
in sentencing (liberal judges give different sentences than conservative judges for certain 
categories of crime); (2) the length of sentence given by judges depends on political 
alignment with the circuit court; and, (3) sentencing judges selectively use fact 
determinations (offense level adjustments) and legal determinations (sentencing range 
departures) to enhance or reduce a criminal sentence, and such instrument choices are 
influenced by the judge's ideology as well as the political-ideological relationship of the 
sentencing judge to the overseeing circuit court. 
We also note two important additions to the literature that come from this study.  
First, we show that instrument choice theory is not limited to the complexity of 
administrative law on which earlier decision instrument studies have focused.3  We 
                                                 
3 Emerson H. Tiller and Pablo T. Spiller, "Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political Games in 
Administrative Law," 15 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 349 (June 1999). 
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develop an instrument choice theory for criminal sentencing and show that basic 
constructs of a judicial system -- political ideology, fact and law-based decision making, 
and appellate review -- drive predictable results.  Second, we offer an empirical study of 
instrument choice that measures the district court-appellate court political relationship, 
something only assumed in the one other empirical study on instrument choice.4   
 
I. United States Sentencing Guidelines 
In 1987, the United States Sentencing Commission, as authorized by the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,5 promulgated the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines to govern 
the sentencing of defendants convicted of federal crimes.  Formerly, judges had nearly 
absolute sentencing discretion within broad statutory ranges.  The Sentencing Guidelines 
were intended to limit judicial discretion and make sentences consistent via the 
introduction of binding regulations and appellate review of sentences.6   
The centerpiece of the Guidelines is a 258-box grid called the Sentencing Table, 
reproduced in Appendix 1, containing presumptively valid prison sentences determined 
by the crime of conviction, offense characteristics, and the felon’s criminal history.  
These sentencing calculations are made by the judge in post-conviction sentencing 
proceedings -- that is, after a plea bargain or the determination of guilt at trial.  The 
                                                 
4 Smith and Tiller (2002). 
5 Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1988 (1984), codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.  See 
also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3551 notes.
628 U.S.C. § 991(b) (“[The Guidelines shall] provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of 
sentencing, avoiding unwarranted disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found 
guilty of similar criminal conduct.”)  Whether the Guidelines decreased inter-judge sentencing disparity 
remains something of an open question.  See Hofer et al., 1999, finding a slight decrease in disparity; 
Anderson et al., 1999, finding a decrease in inter-judge disparities; Lacasse and Payne, 1999, finding no 
change post-Guidelines.   
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horizontal axis of the Sentencing Table measures criminal history across six categories,7 
and the vertical axis (“Offense Level”) measures the severity of the criminal conduct.  
The intersection of these two determinations results in the recommended sentencing 
range expressed in months.  If criminal history and offense level have been properly 
calculated, a sentence within the presumptive range cannot be reversed by the overseeing 
circuit court.8  
Offense Level Adjustments.  For sentencing purposes, the Guidelines classify all 
federal crimes into nineteen generic groupings, such as “offenses against the person,” 
“offenses involving drugs” and “offenses involving the environment.”  Each category 
contains subcategories of crime for which a numerical base offense level is specified.  
For example, for criminal sexual abuse (under “offense against the person”) the base 
offense level is 27.  With a Criminal History of 1, the sentencing range for this crime is 
70 to 83 months.  For illegal entry into the United States, the base offense level is 8; a 
Criminal History of 4 results in a sentencing range of 6 to 12 months.   
While the base offense level is set by the crime of conviction, the Guidelines 
direct the sentencing judge in the post-conviction proceedings to make “adjustments” to 
the base offense level if the judge makes a factual finding that certain “specific offense 
characteristics” listed in the Guidelines are present in the case.9  For certain crimes, for 
example, points may be added to base offense levels when a victim sustained permanent 
                                                 
7 The horizontal axis of the grid, “Criminal History Category,” adjusts the range based on the offender’s 
past conviction record.  The Criminal History Category is more or less set by past judicial determinations 
and is not as easily manipulated as the adjustments to the offense level calculations.  Both the offense level 
calculation and the criminal history determinations are subject to appellate review. A judge may depart 
from the Guidelines if he believes that a defendant’s criminal history over or understates his “true” criminal 
history.  Though regulated by the Guidelines, this is a specific departure and is reviewed as such.  U.S.S.G. 
§ 4A1.3.   
8 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
9 The sentencing judge uses the “preponderance of evidence” standard to make these determinations, a 
standard considerably below the guilt phase standard of “beyond reasonable doubt.” 
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bodily injury, when large quantities of cash were stolen, and when a high level of 
sophistication existed in conducting a fraudulent scheme.  In addition, there are several 
important general adjustments over which the judge has substantial discretion: the 
existence of a vulnerable victim (add 2 to 3 levels);10  the convicted defendant’s role in 
the offense (add or subtract up to 4 levels depending on role);11 the defendant’s 
obstruction of justice (add 2 levels);12 and the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility 
(subtract 2 to 3 levels).13  For the most part, determinations of these characteristics are 
fact-driven.  If found by the judge to exist, these facts lead to adjustments that increase or 
decrease the base offense level and lead to a final offense level which, in combination 
with the convicted defendant’s criminal history, result in higher or lower sentencing 
ranges from which judges choose a prison term.  Although the judge has discretion within 
the range set by the base offense level, adjusting the offense level yields substantial 
changes.  Judges can reduce the minimum sentence between 10% and 15% and increase 
the maximum sentence between 10% and 15% by moving up or down a single offense 
level, and most adjustments are 2 or 3 levels.     
Criminal sentencing scholarship has taken note that the factual determinations 
leading to adjustments are often vague and allow for considerable discretion by the 
judge.14  Consider, for example, the distinction between “minor” and “minimal” 
participation in a crime for the “role in offense” adjustment.  The Sentencing Guidelines 
provide that the offense level should be reduced by two points if the defendant was only a 
“minor” participant in the offense, but by four points if he was a “minimal” participant in 
                                                 
10 U.S.S.G. §§3A1.1-3. 
11 U.S.S.G. §§3B1.1-2. 
12 U.S.S.G. §§3C1.1. 
13 U.S.S.G. §§3E1.1. 
14 See Smith and Cabranes, The Fear of Judging, pp. 91-92. 
 8
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art1
May 23, 2005 
 
the offense.  This factual determination is easily manipulated as the distinction between 
“minor” and “minimal” is not especially clear.  Another fact-based adjustment that can be 
applied in many cases is the two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice, which may 
be applied if the defendant committed perjury, altered documents during the 
investigation, or provided false information to investigators before or after indictment 
that “significantly impeded” the investigation.15  Whether the action “significantly 
impeded” is a determination saturated with discretion.  These adjustments can lead to a 
substantial shift in the relevant sentencing range, or "box", in the Sentencing Table.  For 
example, with a criminal history of one, reducing the offense level from 30 to 28 reduces 
the minimum Guideline sentence by 21 months.    
Although over 90% of sentences are the product of plea bargains, judicial 
discretion over sentencing still plays a major role for two reasons.  First, sentences can be 
substantially adjusted after the plea bargain and, second, the plea bargain occurs in the 
shadow of the sentencing judge.  The defendant pleads guilty to a crime that sets the base 
offense level.  At the sentencing hearing, the judge can make findings of fact that adjust 
that level upward or downward, so in principle the defendant is unsure what sentence he 
will receive.  For example, the defendant could plead guilty to fraud, but dispute the 
amount stolen at the sentencing hearing.   Or the defendant could plead guilty to drug 
trafficking, but the judge could find that he accepted responsibility and adjust the 
sentencing range downward.  For these reasons, some have asserted that the most 
important part of the modern criminal process is the sentencing hearing.16  Even if the 
                                                 
15 The Guidelines themselves state that “[o]bstructive conduct can vary widely in nature” and is “not 
subject to precise definition.”  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 application note 2. 
16 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty 
Pleas, 110 Yale L. J. 1097 (2001). 
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prosecution and defense stipulate as to specific facts that bear on sentence enhancements 
or reductions, the judge need not accept them.  Moreover, the stipulations were likely 
made with an eye toward who would be conducting the sentencing hearing and hence are 
still reflective of the judge’s preferences.   
The prosecution and the convicted defendant can appeal the sentencing judge’s 
adjustments to the base offense level.  These fact-based adjustments are reviewed by the 
circuit court for “clear error” – a legal standard giving substantial discretion to the 
sentencing judge’s conclusion.17  As one Ninth Circuit judge characterized it “under the 
‘significantly deferential’ clear error standard, we may reverse only if left with the 
‘definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ”18  And a Fourth 
Circuit Court judge recently characterized it this way: “The clear error standard is not 
concerned with the certainty of an appellate court regarding its own view of the facts. 
‘Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's [sentencing 
judge’s] choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.’ ”19
Sentencing Range Departures.  In addition to the adjustments mentioned above, 
judges are authorized to depart from the Sentencing Table's recommended range if there 
is an “aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately 
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Sentencing 
                                                 
17 Undoubtedly, there are times when legal determinations must be made along side the factual 
determinations involved in offense level adjustments.  The application of the facts to the Guidelines is a 
mixed question of law and fact, which would typically be reviewed de novo.  Addressing a circuit split for 
the Guideline "career criminal" offense adjustment (which can involve years of extra prison time), the 
Supreme Court recently held that "fact-bound" Guidelines questions, even when involving the applications 
of law to the facts, should generally be reviewed with substantial deference.  Buford v. United States, 532 
U.S. 59, 65-66 (2001).  This was the majority rule prior to the Supreme Court's decision.  Id. at 59.
18 Circuit Court Judge Donald Lay, United States v. Tang, No. 03-10170 (9th Cir., June 23, 2004). 
19 Circuit Court Judge Shedd. United States v. Riggs, No. 03-4017 (4th Cir., June 3, 2004).  
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Guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.”20  Departures 
present law-based issues in addition to factual findings, much more so than do adjustment 
determinations.  A departure involves the legal conclusion by the district court judge that 
the circumstances (facts) of the case “fall outside the ‘heartland’ of the Sentencing 
Guidelines” (a question of law) and thus was not preempted by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating the Guidelines.  The Guidelines prohibit departures on 
grounds that have been either proscribed by the Sentencing Commission or already 
considered by the Sentencing Commission.  Circuit courts have reversed district court 
departures that were based, for example, on family history, post-arrest rehabilitation, 
family responsibility, health, and exemplary military service.21  The courts held that these 
types of departures were, by law, unavailable in the cases at issue.  While undoubtedly 
there are factual determinations to be made in a departure, what distinguishes a departure 
from an adjustment is the added legal conclusion that a new category of circumstances 
justifies a sentencing enhancement or reduction.  The government can appeal to the 
overseeing circuit court a downward departure from the Sentencing Table, and the 
defendant similarly can appeal an upward departure.  
The government can facilitate downward departures by itself moving for a 
“substantial assistance” downward departure based on the offender’s cooperation in 
prosecuting other offenders, and judges can only grant substantial assistance departures 
                                                 
20 18 U.S.C. 3553(b); see also U.S.S.G. 5K.2.0 (Policy Statement). In 1994, the Sentencing Commission 
adopted the position that factors “not ordinarily” relevant can still be considered if they remove the case 
from the “heartland” of the Guidelines.  The Supreme Court subsequently endorsed the “heartland” 
departures concept in Koon v. United States in 1996.  518 U.S. 81 (1996). It also held that departures from 
the Guidelines should be reviewed by circuit courts for “abuse of discretion.”  Prior to Koon some circuits 
gave an even stricter de novo standard of review to downward departures.  Consistent with the argument 
that departures are discouraged and strictly reviewed under either the “abuse of discretion” or de novo 
standard, Hoffer et al. (1997) found little change in the rate of downward departures post Koon.  (See also 
Sentencing Commission 2003.) 
21 See Stith and Cabranes, The Fear of Judging, p. 100. 
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on the motion of the government.   Some of the analysis below removes substantial-
assistance departures from the sample on the theory that the prosecution has significant 
control over the sentence at this point and, consequently, the judges’ preferences should 
matter less.  
 
II. Positive Political Theory of Criminal Sentencing    
 The theory we present here builds on the growing work in “law and positive 
political theory.”  While many of the early papers focused on Congress and its 
interactions with regulatory agencies and courts,22 positive theorists eventually turned 
their attention to strategic behavior within judicial hierarchies.23   This judicial hierarchy 
literature generally views the behavior of judges as “strategically” political, rather than 
merely political or naively legal-minded.  Specifically, judges are modeled as policy 
maximizers who work within a set of defined institutional rules, and who anticipate the 
reactions by other players before making their own choices with the ambition of 
maximizing their preferences after all players have acted.  Much of the work has 
incorporated game theory and institutional economics.  A branch of this work has 
                                                 
22 McNollgast, “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control”, 3 J.L. Econ. & Org. 243 
(1987); McNollgast, “Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the 
Political Control of Agencies”, 75 Va. L. Rev. 431 (1989); Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller, “A Rational 
Choice Theory of Supreme Court Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases”, 6 
J.L. Econ. & Org. 263 (1990); Pablo T. Spiller, “Agency Discretion Under Judicial Review”, 16 
Mathematical and Computer Modeling 185-200; Pablo T. Spiller and Emerson H. Tiller, Decision Costs 
and the Strategic Design of Administrative Process and Judicial Review, 26 J. Legal Stud. 347 (1997).
23 Emerson H. Tiller and Pablo T. Spiller, “Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political Games in 
Administrative Law”, 15 J L, Econ, & Org 349, 351-52 (1999); Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey Segal, and 
Charles Cameron, "The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit 
Court Interactions," 38 American Journal of Political Science 673-96 (1994); McNollgast, “Politics and the 
Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law,” 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1631, 1641-47 
(1995) Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A.Segal, and Donald Songer, "Strategic Auditing in a Political 
Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court's Certiorari Decisions," 94 American Political 
Science Review 101-16 (2000).
 12
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art1
May 23, 2005 
 
attempted to bring legal structures such as decision instruments and doctrines into the 
strategic model.24   
The work most directly related to our study here is the strategic instruments 
framework proposed by Tiller and Spiller (1999) which modeled the behavior of 
agencies, lower courts, and higher courts in the context of administrative law.25  That 
model suggested that an agency would chose adjudication over rulemaking if it wanted to 
protect a policy agenda in the face of a court that would not favor the agency’s new 
policy agenda.  Similarly, the model suggested that lower court judges, when faced with a 
higher court whose preferences are aligned with the agency rather than the lower court, 
would choose “reasoning process” failures by the agency (predominantly a fact-based 
decision making by the lower court) for protecting its reversal of the agency policy, 
rather than relying on statutory interpretation (a law-based decision instrument). Smith 
and Tiller (2002) tested the theory using appellate court decisions reviewing the 
Environmental Protection Agency and found support for the theory.26  
From a theoretical perspective, we note that criminal sentencing decisions differ 
from other judicial decisions in important respects.  A sentencing hearing provides the 
judge with a richer set of options than she usually confronts in doctrinal decisions.  Many 
of the previous positive political theory models that assumed a policy continuum over 
which judges could strategically pinpoint a policy location lacked realism.  Many 
                                                 
24 For a discussion of the difficulties, and opportunities, in modeling legal doctrine in a positive political 
theory, see Emerson H. Tiller and Frank B. Cross, What is Legal Doctrine?, Northwestern Law Review 
(forthcoming, 2005). 
25 Emerson H. Tiller and Pablo T. Spiller, “Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political Games in 
Administrative Law”, 15 J L, Econ, & Org 349, 351-52 (1999).
26 Joseph L. Smith and Emerson H. Tiller,”The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law”, 
31 J. Legal Stud. 61 (2002); A separate study by Richard Revesz (1997) that also examined circuit court 
review of EPA decisions had empirical findings consistent with the basic constructs of the model. Richard 
L. Revesz, “Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit”, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717 (1997). 
 13
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
May 23, 2005 
 
doctrinal decisions are “yes”/”no” decisions, or use the status quo as a reversion point if 
the new policy is not adopted.  Sentencing, by contrast, offers more “ranges” or 
continuums and thus, may allow more strategic choices for a sentencing judge, thereby 
making a strategic model more realistic.27  
In the sentencing model we present here, there are two actors: federal district 
court judges who sentence criminal offenders and circuit courts which can sustain or 
overturn the sentencing decisions of the district judges.   Judges at both levels have policy 
preferences regarding criminal sentencing.  In assigning preferences, we adopt the 
conventional wisdom that liberals (Democrats) prefer more lenient sentences for “street” 
crimes (violent, theft, and drug crimes) than conservatives (Republicans).28  Conventional 
wisdom also suggests that Republicans prefer more lenient sentences than Democrats for 
environmental and white collar crimes than do Democrats.  This conventional wisdom 
has some empirical support.  For example, in a poll taken in 2003, 84% of self-identified 
Republicans favored the death penalty for murders compared with 54% of self-identified 
Democrats.29  In 2002, 77% of self-identified Republicans said sentences were not harsh 
enough compared to 65% of self-identified Democrats.30  Two-percent of self-identified 
Republicans said that sentences were too harsh compared to 11% of self-identified 
Democrats.  There is no reason to believe that such widespread partisan differences 
                                                 
27  Although the Sentencing Guidelines provided more limits to this discretion than before their adoption in 
1987, there remains considerable latitude through the use of adjustments and departure for the sentencing 
judge to pinpoint her sentencing preferences.  
28 We use the word “street” crime somewhat loosely.  The crimes at issue here are federal crimes, so our 
criminals are not typical.  Most of the crimes have interstate characteristics.  In the time frame of the 
sample, 43% of those sentenced under the federal Guidelines were sentenced for drug trafficking, over 14% 
were sentenced for fraud, and 8.5% for immigration offenses.   Within broad categories, the crimes here are 
also federal in nature.  For example, over 90% of the violent crimes in the sample are armed bank robbery, 
and 96% of the “drug crimes” in the sample are for trafficking (less than 3% are for possession).   
29 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, table 2-50 (2004), available at 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t243.pdf. 
30 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 2002, page 141. 
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would not reflect themselves among judicial appointees in setting sentences for convicted 
felons.  A considerable amount of research shows ideological differences between 
Democrat and Republican court appointees (decisions involving environment, labor, etc), 
particularly at the circuit level.31   
 In addition to having preferences over sentencing outcomes, we assume that 
district court judges do not want to be reversed.  This may be for several reasons.  First, a 
reversal may bring with it certain restrictions on a re-sentencing that would move a judge 
farther away from her preferred sentence than if she had not been reversed in the first 
place.  In other words, the circuit court may put limits on what factors can be considered 
in the particular case that could lead to a longer or shorter prison term on re-sentencing.  
Second, there may be reputation costs in being reversed that a district court judge may 
want to avoid.  Finally, district judges may wish to keep their dockets clear and not want 
to create more work that would come from a sentencing reversal.32   
Next, we emphasize the role of decision instruments – fact-based adjustments to 
base offense levels and law-based departures from the sentencing range.  District court 
judges have the power to change the sentencing range through adjustments to base 
offense levels, or to go outside a recommended sentencing range in the Guidelines Table 
with a departure.  Fact-based adjustments receive less stringent review by the circuit 
courts and thus allow the sentencing judge considerable leeway in changing the 
                                                 
31 See Daniel Pinello, 1999, for a meta-analysis and George, 2001. The controversial Feeney Amendment 
to the guidelines, which makes downward departures much more difficult, was passed at the behest of 
congressional Republicans and exposed partisan divides over sentencing practices.  For a full discussion of 
the origins and the particulars of the Feeney Amendment, see the The Feeney Amendment: Roots and 
Reactions, 15 FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER (June 2003). 
32 We note, however, that it is plausible that judges, at least sometimes, may care less about reversal, or 
even invite it, because there could be positive reputation benefits from a reversal.  For example, a Democrat 
appointed judge reversed by a Republican dominated circuit court could improve the chances that the 
Democrat appointed judge could be appointed to an even higher court. 
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sentencing range by calculating a higher or lower final offense level.   This deference by 
the circuit courts may be the result of high review cost – information gathering and 
monitoring of case specific factual details not easily observable by the circuit courts on 
review -- and the highly deferential “clear error” doctrinal standard of appellate review 
for adjustments to the offense level by sentencing judges.  The clear error standard may 
be related to, or even the result of, the high review cost attendant in monitoring factual 
details.  Moreover, the circuit court may, for reputation reasons or even sincere belief in 
the limits of its discretion under this review doctrine, be hesitant to reverse the lower 
court’s factual findings.33  In either case, the model predicts substantial deference by the 
circuit courts to factual determinations by the district court judges.34, 35   
To the extent that adjustments are insufficient to maximize the sentencing judge’s 
preferences on the length of a prison term, the judge may departure from the Guidelines' 
presumptive range resulting from offense level calculations.  Departures are more 
susceptible to review and reversal by the circuit court because they introduce a legal 
determination in addition to any factual findings.  The circuit court can reverse the 
district court on the threshold legal finding of whether the Guidelines already incorporate 
the circumstances relied upon by the sentencing judge and whether or not the 
circumstances, even if not covered by the Guidelines, are sufficiently unusual to warrant 
                                                 
33 Although we do not model the Supreme Court into the framework, it could be that the deference level is 
affected also by the alignment conditions between the Supreme Court, Circuit Court and the district court 
judge.   
34 We note that while the sentencing judge enjoys substantial deference from the circuit court on adjustment 
determinations, the sentencing judge’s discretion is not wholly unbridled.  The judge cannot dream up facts 
that have no basis, and the Guidelines limit the number of categories for which an adjustment can be made. 
35 One may be concerned that the legal standard is easily changed by the higher court for a given case.  
Without going into substantial detail here, we assume that circuit courts want legal doctrines or standards to 
have more durability across a series of decisions and will not make changes in the doctrine for any one 
case.  If over a series of cases the standard continues to fail in achieving the circuit court’s preferences, a 
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a departure. The appellate review of the legal conclusion underlying a departure is 
governed by an abuse of discretion standard -- a standard allowing the circuit court to be 
more exacting and less deferential than the clear error standard used for review of factual 
determinations.36  These conditions suggest that the sentencing judge is at much greater 
risk of reversal when a departure from the recommended sentencing range is undertaken 
than when an adjustment to offense level is made. 
We next introduce political competition effects and, in particular, the role of 
political-ideological alignment between the sentencing judges and the overseeing circuit 
courts.  To the extent that an overseeing circuit court is politically aligned with the 
district court (both courts liberal or both conservative) the sentencing judge should enjoy 
relatively more discretion in both adjustment and departure decisions.  In that case, the 
higher court has little incentive to aggressively review adjustments or departures as it 
would prefer a sentencing outcome similar to the one chosen by the like-minded 
sentencing judge.  If the two courts are not aligned, however, the calculus changes.  
While adjustments may still enjoy deference by the circuit court of appeal because of the 
deference generally accorded fact decisions, the sentencing judge bears a greater risk in 
making a law-based departure.   
To summarize the theory: (1) district and appellate judges have ideological 
preferences over sentencing (that is, Democrat appointees prefer less prison time for 
street crimes); (2) sentencing judges adjust prison sentence length based upon the relative 
political alignment between the sentencing judge and the overseeing circuit court, and (3) 
                                                 
36 Koon held that departures from the Guidelines should be reviewed by circuit courts for “abuse of 
discretion.”  518 U.S. at 96-97.  Prior to Koon, some circuits gave an even stricter de novo standard of 
review to downward departures.  Consistent with the argument that departures are discouraged and strictly 
reviewed under either the “abuse of discretion” or de novo standard, Hoffer et al. (1997) found little change 
in the rate of downward departures post Koon.  (See also Sentencing Commission 2003.) 
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the sentencing judge’s use of sentencing departures is dependant upon political alignment 
with the circuit court – specifically, sentencing judges increase their use of law-based 
departures (legal determinations) when politically aligned with the circuit court and 
reduce them when not aligned; by comparison, the use of fact-based adjustments are 
fairly independent of alignment conditions.   
The theory leaves us with the following sets propositions: 
Ideology and Political Alignment 
• Proposition A-1: Democrat-appointed district court judges give lower prison 
sentences than Republican-appointed judges for street crimes (violent, theft, and 
drug crimes). 
• Proposition A-2: Democrat-appointed district court judges give lower prison 
sentences for street crimes when politically aligned with the circuit court than 
when not aligned. 
Political Ideology, Decision Instruments, and Political Alignment 
• Proposition B-1: Democrat-appointed district court judges calculate lower 
adjusted offense levels than Republican-appointed district court judges for street 
crimes.  
• Proposition B-2: Democrat-appointed district court judges calculate lower 
adjusted offense levels than Republican-appointed judges for street crimes 
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• Proposition B-3: Democrat-appointed district court judges calculate larger 
downward departures from the recommended sentencing range for street crimes 
when politically aligned with the circuit court than when not aligned.   
 
III. Empirical Analysis 
The United States Sentencing Commission collects information on every 
individual sentenced under the Sentencing Guidelines and makes available a public use 
data file.37  The sentencing data record the offender’s criminal history, the base offense 
level (crime of conviction), the final offense level calculated by the district court after 
adjustments have been made, whether a departure was granted, and the offender’s prison 
sentence in months.  The sentencing data also include a number of important offender 
demographic variables, such as age, race, educational attainment, number of dependents, 
and citizenship.  The data, however, do not reveal the identity of the sentencing judge -- 
only the broader federal district from which the judge was drawn. 
 We use sentencing data from 1992 through 2001.  We begin with 1992 because 
the Guidelines were upheld by the Supreme Court in 1989 and the permissibility of 
certain grounds for downward departures became clearer in the early 1990s.  These years 
yield a population of 474,275.  Because a number of key offender characteristics are 
missing for many individuals, such as offense type, total prison sentence, or demographic 
variables, the sample was reduced to 406,670.38  We also eliminated immigration cases 
                                                 
37 The data are available from the University of Michigan’s Inter-university Consortium for Policy and 
Social Research, http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/09317.xml. 
38 There is one important measurement issue that must also be addressed.  Life imprisonment is possible in 
certain Guideline ranges, and it is not clear how to calculate the prison sentence level in months for a life 
sentence.  It could be imputed based on the life expectancy of the offender, but then other offenders (say a 
40-year-old who received a 40-year sentence) would also have effective life sentences.  We therefore 
excluded life sentences from the analysis, further reducing the sample size.  As a check, we also top-coded 
 19
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
May 23, 2005 
 
because of the widely noted trends in immigration offenses in this time period and other 
miscellaneous, traffic, and national defense related offenses, leaving a sample size of 
365,062.39    
Table 1a in Appendix 2 gives the means and variances of some variables of 
interest. Adjustments that alter the base offense level are very common, occurring in 91% 
of all cases.  Fifty-three percent of cases are adjusted to levels below the base level, and 
38% are adjusted to levels above the base level.  Judge-induced departures (non-
substantial assistance) occurred in approximately 11% of the cases; 10% of them are 
downward departures, less than 1% are upward departures. 
Ideally, we would match the sentencing judge to each sentencing outcome, but the 
sentencing data do not identify the sentencing judge, and the Sentencing Commission 
will not release the information.  Therefore, we rely on district-level data for calculating 
political orientation of district court judges.  We know from the Sentencing Commission 
data the district in which an offender was sentenced, and we know the proportion of 
judges appointed by a Democrat and Republican president on that district’s bench.  The 
data on the political composition of the district courts comes from the Federal Judicial 
Center biographical data on federal judges.40  We use the political variation within the 
                                                                                                                                                 
life sentences as the highest observed sentence in months (990) and ran the same analysis.  Ultimately, 
either excluding or including life sentences made little difference to the results.     
39 The United States Sentencing Commission has documented the increasing rate of both prosecution of 
immigration offenses and downward departures granted pursuant to them (U.S. Sentencing Commission 
2003).   
40 History of the Federal Judiciary, available at http://www.fjc.gov.  Studies that have examined judicial 
characteristics and case outcomes have controlled for a number of factors other than partisan affiliation, 
such as age, race, sex, and previous work experience.  (See George 2002 for a survey.)  Schanzenbach 
(2005) found little general effect of the age, race, or sex of the judge on prison sentences, although 
sentences for specific demographic groups of offenders were affected.     
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district to measure the impact of political ideology on sentencing.41  We let 
%DEMOCRAT = percentage of active judges appointed by a Democratic president on 
the relevant district bench for the year of the observed sentence.  The higher this 
percentage, the greater the chance an individual offender is sentenced by a Democrat-
appointed judge.   Of course, it is possible that the character of the district may be 
changed by the proportion of judges on the bench.  For example, local rules and 
sentencing norms may be determined by judges, and one may wish to keep in step with 
one’s close colleagues.  In other words, adding Democrats or Republicans may change 
the attitudes of judges of the opposite party as well.  The coefficients should be 
interpreted with this caveat. 
To control for possible age effects, we include the average age of the district court 
judges as an independent variable.  Although average judge age was rarely significant, 
our results for the %DEMOCRAT were slightly stronger in some specifications (those 
taking final offense level as the dependant variable) after controlling for age.  District 
dummies are included in every regression and should capture any district-specific effects.  
In addition, including district dummies means that we identify the political effects solely 
from changes in the political composition of the bench. 
We assign the circuit court overseeing the district judges in any given year a 
Democrat or Republican designation based upon whether the majority of the active 
circuit court judges on that court were appointed by a Democrat or Republican president.  
We let CIRCDEM = 1 if the circuit majority is Democrat in the year of the decision, and 
                                                 
41 Note that this is the typical convention used in political science.  See Pinello, supra note **; and, Cass 
Sunstein, David Schkade, and Lisa Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeal: A Preliminary 
Investigation, 90 VIR. L. REV. 301 (2004). 
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0 if majority is Republican in the year of the sentence.  In some specifications, we will 
allow CIRCDEM to take on a more flexible form by further subdividing it.42    
The remaining variables of interest are from the sentencing data:  
 
BOL = base offense level (the offense level before adjustments, largely 
determined by the crime for which the defendant was convicted);   
FOL = final offense level as calculated by the judge after any adjustments are 
made; 
FINALCHANGE = difference between final sentence given and minimum 
sentence of FOL/Criminal History combination presumptive sentencing 
range; 
BASECHANGE = difference between final sentence given and minimum 
sentence of BOL/Criminal History combination presumptive sentencing 
range; 
GRID = Position on the sentencing grid (dummy variables for FOL or BOL, 
criminal history, and an interaction term for criminal history/offense 
level).  In addition, a variable for statutory minimum sentence is entered. 
OFFTYPE = Primary offense of conviction 
 
We divide the primary offense of conviction into nine separate categories: 
                                                 
42 We use CIRCDEM as a dummy instead of a percentage for a couple of reasons.  First, the district-level 
variable is (by necessity) a percentage.  If we specify a percentage for the circuit, the interaction term 
becomes an interaction of levels, which is hard to interpret.  Second, the interaction of levels imposes a 
symmetry that is not theoretically justifiable.  For example, consider one district of 20% Democrats and a 
circuit of 40% Democrats, and another that is the opposite-40% on the district and 20% on the circuit.  The 
interaction term would be the same (800) but there is no reason to suppose that the effect should be the 
same.   
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 VIOLENT = Violent crime (e.g., murder,, sex abuse, assault, robbery) 
 THEFT = Theft (e.g., auto, burglary) 
 DRUG = All drug offenses 
 RACKETEERING = Racketeering and gambling offenses 
 PORN = Obscenity/child pornography offenses 
 OBSTRUCT = Obstruction of justice offenses 
 CIVILRIGHT = Civil rights offenses 
 ENVIRON = Environmental offenses 
 WHITECOL = White collar (e.g., tax, embezzlement, fraud, antitrust) 
  
We also enter dummy variables for year of sentencing (YEAR) and district of 
sentencing (DISTRICT).  As control variables, we add a number of individual offender 
characteristics (OFFENDER), including age, race, sex, education, number of dependents, 
citizenship status, and the type of trial.43   
 
Political Orientation, Adjustments, and Prison Term. We first consider generally 
whether Democrat-appointed district court judges give lower prison sentences than 
Republican-appointed judges.  We estimate the following equation: 
 
                                 E%DEMOCRATAVAGEGRID







                                                 
43 Age of offender is controlled for by a quadratic age term; race is controlled for by dummies for black, 
Hispanic, Asian, and other; education is controlled for by dummies for high school completion, college 
completion, and advanced degree; number of dependents is controlled for by dummies indication no, one, 
or two dependents; and type of trial is controlled for by a dummy indicating that the case was disposed of 
by a jury or bench trial.   
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where i indexes individual sentenced, j indexes district, and t indexes year.  Theory 
suggests that we should examine offense level calculations and departure magnitudes 
directly, which we do next.  There are some important reasons to examine total prison 
sentences before turning to the more offense level and departure magnitude.  First, it 
makes our study more comparable to other Guidelines studies (e.g., Mustard, 2001).  
Second, prison term is the most socially relevant variable since it actually measures the 
cost to the prisoner (and society).  Third, prison sentences are where the full effect of 
adjustments and departures are revealed.  Violent and drug trafficking offenses start at 
very high base offense levels.  Small offense level adjustments can lead to large changes 
in the minimum sentence (a one unit reduction in offense level reduces the minimum 
possible sentence by 10% -- about 10 months in the serious crimes we are considering).  
This is very important if the judge favors a lower sentence.   
Because we are using district-level variation on individual data, the standard 
errors are Huber-White robust and reflect clustering by district.  The coefficient of 
interest is δ, which is interpreted as the effect on prison sentences from increasing the 
percentage of Democrats on the district bench by 1%.  
For ease of interpretation, the %DEMOCRAT coefficients are all multiplied by 
100.  On the assumption that criminal cases are randomly assigned and retirements and 
replacements of judges occur randomly, the %DEMOCRAT coefficient reflects the 
impact of an entirely Republican-appointed bench versus an entirely Democrat-appointed 
bench.  If our identification strategy is valid, the reported coefficients mimic a dummy 
variable specification based on individual judge identity.  We also note that, because 
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judges are either Republican or Democrat-appointed, δ really measures how Democrats 
behave relative to Republicans.  We cannot say whether Democrats are unduly lenient, or 
Republicans unfairly harsh.  We only measure the relative positions of Republican and 
Democrat sentencing practices based on the political composition of the district bench.   
Table 1 presents the results for all crimes and for specific crime categories.  To 
account for the large percentage of zero prison sentences (about 20% of the total), we use 
Tobit regressions on total prison sentence.44  There are two ways to control for offense 
level position on the Sentencing Table (GRID).  Models 1 and 2 below condition on final 
offense level (FOL), while Models 3 through 6 condition on base offense level (BOL).  
Our theory suggests, however, that the final offense level is not exogenously given; its 
determination may be manipulated by the judge who can make “adjustments."  Thus, 
conditioning on final offense level is problematic as it removes from the analysis the 
discretion judges exercise through offense level adjustments.  Rather than rely on final 
offense level, then, Models 3 through 6 condition sentencing on the base offense level 
(BOL).  These regressions rely on the assumption that, to the sentencing judge at least, 
the base offense level is largely exogenous and the final offense level is endogenous.   
In Models 1 and 2, the coefficient on %DEMOCRAT is small and not statistically 
significant.  Model 2 allows for different political impacts by offense category by 
interacting each offense category with %DEMOCRAT.  There are no partisan effects for 
specific crimes significant at the 5% level or less, and the coefficients are not jointly 
significant (p-value .1572).  In sum, when we condition on final offense level, there are 
no discernable political effects in sentencing. 
                                                 
44 Due to convergence problems, the dummy-variable controls for FOL and BOL proved intractable in the 
Tobit models, so we entered a fifth-order polynomial in the numeric final or base offense level, dummies 
for criminal history, and an interaction between criminal history level and the numeric offense level. 
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TABLE 1: TOTAL PRISON SENTENCE IN MONTHS  






























       
       
























































































































  (5.75) 
3.81 
Joint test of 
%DEMOCRAT 
Interactions (p-value) 
.1572 <.0001 .0006 .0013 .0051
Crime-Specific Linear 
Time Trends No No No No No Yes No
Offense Level Control FOL FOL BOL BOL BOL BOL None
N=365,062.  Not reported: District dummies, offense type dummies (main effects), offense level (base or final), criminal history, criminal 
history*offense level, demographic characteristics. ***coefficient significant at less than 1% level, **coefficient significant at 5% level or 
less, *coefficient significant at 10% level or less.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  All %DEMOCRAT coefficients multiplied by 100. In 
tobit specifications, offense levels are controlled for via a fifth-order polynomial in offense level. 
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 As discussed, the structure of sentencing law and instrument choice theory 
suggest that final offense level calculations are endogenous.  Models 3 and 4 condition on 
base offense levels instead of final offense levels, which allows the manipulation of the 
adjustment instrument to be reflected in the %DEMOCRAT coefficient.  Consistent with 
our theory, under this specification stronger political effects are evident and are signed as 
expected.   
In Model 3, the coefficient on %DEMOCRAT*100 is -3.56, relative to -.13 for 
Model 1, but is still not significant.  In other words, when all crimes categories are 
grouped together, the political ideology of the judges still has no effect on sentencing.  
Model 4 allows for differing political impacts by crime category, and the results strongly 
indicate a partisan sentencing effect.  Sentence lengths for violent, theft, and drug crimes 
are between 7 and 9 months lower for Democrat-appointed judges compared to 
Republican-appointed judges.  This is to be contrasted with an average sentence of 70 
months for these crimes, suggesting a roughly 10% sentencing differential between 
Republicans and Democrats. We also note that the interactions between %DEMOCRAT 
and white collar and environmental crimes, while not significant at the 5% level, now 
have sizeable positive coefficients.  The joint test of the %DEMOCRAT/offense type 
interactions is highly significant (p-value <.0001), indicating strong partisan differences 
in how crimes are treated across categories.   
 The next few columns test the robustness of the results obtained in Model 4.  
Because Tobit models require strong distributional assumptions and are sensitive to 
unobserved heterogeneity, we use an OLS regression in Model 5 and obtain surprisingly 
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similar results.  Another possible concern is that secular changes in sentence practices 
occurred over the 1990s and were simply correlated with the increasing proportion of 
Democrats on the district bench.  Column 6 includes crime-specific linear time trends to 
check for the possibility that our results are conflated with trends for specific crimes, and 
they survive largely intact.   
 A final concern is the exogeneity of the base offense level itself, which can be 
influenced by the charges that are brought or dropped by the prosecution.  Plea 
agreements may reflect charge bargaining, and these negotiations occur in the shadow of 
the judge, setting the bargaining parameters.  In unreported regressions, we examined 
directly whether or not the base offense level is influenced by the political composition of 
the district court and did not detect a correlation, suggesting that the base offense level is 
largely exogenous.   
 However, the base offense level is determined in a unique way in drug trafficking 
cases.  The quantity and type of drugs at issue determines the base offense level, whereas 
in general the base offense level is determined by the crime itself and then adjusted by the 
judge to reflect the quantities at issue (e.g., the amount of money lost due to a fraud).  As 
such, the base offense level in the case of drugs represents a calculation over which the 
judge has some control at sentencing.  Therefore, in practice, it is an offense level 
adjustment.45 Because drug trafficking cases frequently involve broader conspiracies to 
distribute, the amount of drugs at issue is often in dispute and plays an important role in 
the sentencing hearing.46  In addition, prosecutors and defendants can stipulate in a plea 
                                                 
45 This is widely recognized.  For a discussion, see Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2546 (J. 
O’Connor, dissenting) (2004). 
46 For a discussion, see Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of 
Guilty Pleas, 110 Yale L. J. 1097 (2001).  Bibas suggests that after Apprendi prosecutors had more 
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agreement to the type and amount of drugs, and therefore influence the base offense level 
(although the judge need not abide by the stipulation, it is likely to be highly influential).  
This bargaining undoubtedly occurs in the shadow of the judge. Column 7 removes the 
base offense level dummies, but continues to include criminal history dummies.  Given 
the foregoing discussion, we would expect to see the biggest impact on drug crimes.  Not 
surprisingly, the coefficient on %DEMOCRAT*DRUG more than doubles in size, while 
interactions with violent crime and theft slightly increase.   
 The conclusion we draw from this analysis is that the political orientation of the 
judge matters with respect to street crimes and that sentencing differences reveal 
themselves in part through the selective use of adjustments to the base offense level in the 
sentencing proceedings.  These results are consistent with our theory (Propositions A-1 
and B-1).47
 
Political Orientation, Circuit Court Alignment, and Prison Term.  Next we test whether 
Democrat-appointed district court judges give lower prison sentences for street crimes 
when politically aligned with the circuit court than when not aligned.  We consider circuit 
alignment effects by including a dummy, CIRCDEM, equal to one when the circuit court 
is majority Democrat-appointed judges and zero when the circuit majority is Republican-
appointed.  We then interact this dummy with %DEMOCRAT and re-estimate equation 1 
                                                                                                                                                 
influence over sentencing factors, but Apprendi was decided in 2000 and therefore has little effect on our 
sample.  Id. at 1160-167 
47 These results are remarkably consistent with the findings of Boylan (2004).  Boylan found that district 
court judges were more likely to take senior status after the Sentencing Guidelines were adopted, and the 
case mix affected Democrats and Republicans in different ways.  Democrats and Republicans were both 
more likely to take senior status after the Guidelines, but this effect was larger for Democrats in districts 
with high drug caseloads, but not for Republicans in those districts.   
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above.  This interaction term (%DEMOCRAT*CIRCDEM) is the marginal effect that 




May 23, 2005 
 
TABLE 2: TOTAL PRISON SENTENCE IN MONTHS, CIRCUIT ALIGNMENT EFFECTS 
(VIOLENT, DRUG, AND THEFT OFFENSES) 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
%DEMOCRATa -6.98** (3.37) 
-5.55 
      (3.84) 
-6.39* 
      (3.55) 
-5.50 
      (3.81) 
-13.29*** 
        (4.88) 
-10.01** 
        (4.94) 
-13.20*** 
        (4.91) 
-9.91** 
        (4.29) 
CIRCDEM  2.14       (2.05) 
 
 4.88 
      (3.29) 
 4.88 
        (3.29) 
 4.90 
        (3.12) 
%DEMOCRAT
*CIRCDEMb
      
        
        
    
-6.14
     (4.02) 
-8.15** 
      (3.96) 
-13.82**
        (5.83) 
-14.23**
        (5.83) 
Joint test of a & b 
 .0483 .0106 .0016 .0017
Crime-Specific 
Time Trends No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Offense Control Base   Level 
Base   
Level 
Base   
Level 
Base   
Level None None None None
OLS regressions, N=238,299.  Not reported: District dummies, offense type, base offense level, criminal history, criminal 
history*offense level, demographic characteristics. ***coefficient significant at less than 1% level, **coefficient significant at 5% 
level or less, *coefficient significant at 10% level or less.  All %DEMOCRAT coefficients multiplied by 100. 
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 Model 1 of Table 2 estimates the %DEMOCRAT effect, without consideration of 
political alignment, and Model 2 adds alignment effects.  Model 1 shows that a 
Democrat-appointed district judge would issue a prison sentence for street crimes roughly 
7 months shorter than would a Republican-appointed district judge.  Compared to an 
average prison sentence of 70 months for these offenses, this represents a sizeable 
discount (approximately 10%).  When circuit court alignment is considered, the results 
are not independently significant but are jointly significant at less than the 5% level.48  
Taking the coefficients at face value and ignoring the CIRCDEM coefficient, the 
alignment of a Democratic circuit with an all Democrat-appointed district would result in 
a sentence reduction of nearly 12 months, versus just 5.5 for an unaligned district. 49    
 The remaining models test the robustness of our results.  The results remain 
largely intact when we enter crime-specific time trends in Models 3 and 4, and roughly 
double when we do not condition on the base offense level in Models 5 through 8.   In 
Models 6 and 8, circuit alignment again more than doubles the partisan effect.  Ignoring 
the insignificant CIRCDEM dummy coefficient, an all Democrat-appointed bench in an 
                                                 
48 Schanzenbach (2005) found that these judge characteristics did not greatly affect the overall sentence, but 
in certain cases affected the sentences of minority and female offenders. 
49 The same prison sentence analysis was performed for white collar and environmental crimes for which 
Republican-appointed judges might be expected to be more lenient than Democrat-appointed judges.  
When these offenses were analyzed independently, however, partisan differences were not discernable.  
This may be because there are no partisan differences, or because of smaller sample sizes, lower jail 
sentences for these crimes in general (making it harder to detect any differences), and less of an impact on 
sentencing ranges from altering low offense levels. For example, the Sentencing Commission statistics 
indicate that, during 2001, the average sentence for white collar crime was just over 20 months, while the 
average sentence for drug and violent crimes was 71.7 and 89.5 months, respectively.  U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, 2001 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics 32 fig. E (2001).  As discussed below, 




May 23, 2005 
 
aligned circuit would give roughly 24-month lower sentences, and an all Democrat-
appointed bench in an unaligned circuit would give a 10 month lower sentence.50
In sum, the prison sentence regressions are strong evidence that there are sizeable 
partisan differences in sentencing.  Democrat appointees on average sentence street crime 
offenders to terms between 10% and 20% lower than Republican appointees, depending 
on whether we condition on base offense levels or exclude offense levels altogether.  
Base offense levels may capture important elements of the crime and hence should be 
included as a control.  On the other hand, in drug cases base offense levels can be 
manipulated at the sentencing hearing and arguably are endogenous.  Thus, we believe 
that the 10% figure (representing roughly seven months) is a lower bound estimate of 
partisan effects on sentencing.   Another important result is that partisan effects are 
amplified when there is circuit court alignment.  When the circuit court is aligned, the 
effects are nearly doubled.   
The prison sentence regressions cannot demonstrate that judges are using 
sentencing instruments strategically.  To understand this, we next calculate direct partisan 
effects on offense level calculations and the effect on prison sentences from departures 
and adjustments.  
 
Political Orientation, Circuit Court Alignment, and Adjustments.  We now test directly 
whether Democrat-appointed district court judges calculate lower final offense levels 
(resulting from adjustments) than Republican-appointed district court judges, and 
                                                 
50 Some specifications included additional characteristics of the bench: the percent judges who are African 
American, the percent Hispanic, and the percent female.  Little was added by including these variables, 
which are highly correlated with the percent Democratic appointees anyway, and they were not individually 
significant while %DEMOCRAT remained statistically significant.   
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whether political alignment matters to the calculation.  To test these two propositions, we 
estimate the following equation, taking final offense level as the dependent variable: 
 
                                 E%DEMOCRATAVAGECRIMHIST*BOLCRIMHIST
BOLθOFFTYPEsηOFFENDERDISTRICT λYEARαConstant (2)FOL







 Again, we use BOL dummies, CRIMHIST dummies, and the interaction of BOL 
and CRIMHIST to control for initial position on the Sentencing Guidelines Table grid.  
To test for circuit court alignment effects, we simply include CIRCDEM and 
%DEMOCRAT*CIRCDEM in the equation.51
 Table 3 presents the results.  In Model 1, the coefficient on %DEMOCRAT 
implies that Democrat-appointed judges would calculate .45 lower final offense level on 
average, although the result is not statistically significant.  Model 2 allows varying 
impacts by offense category, and a clearer picture is revealed.  Democrat-appointees 
calculate higher offense levels for white collar and environmental crimes, and lower 
offense levels for drug crimes, than do Republican appointees.  Again, the test of joint 
significance strongly supports partisan effects.  The results are weaker when crime-
specific time trends are added in Model 3, and the significant effect on white collar crime 
disappears entirely.  The joint test remains strong, however.  In sum, the empirical results 




                                                 
51 Although the equations are estimated by OLS, given that the dependant variable, final offense level 
(FOL), is a strictly positive integer, negative binomial regression is arguably more appropriate.  Negative 
binomial regressions yielded the same results, so OLS is presented for ease of interpretation.  
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TABLE 3: FINAL OFFENSE LEVEL 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
%DEMOCRAT -.45  (.29) 
  
%DEMOCRAT*VIOLENT  -.49  (.30) 
-.32 
 (.31) 
%DEMOCRAT*THEFT  -.74  (.66) 
-.74 
 (.72) 
%DEMOCRAT*DRUG  -1.26***  (.35) 
-.56* 
 (.31) 
%DEMOCRAT*RACKETEER  -.14  (.56) 
-.32 
 (.70) 
%DEMOCRAT*PORN  .61  (.60) 
-.30 
 (.50) 
%DEMOCRAT*OBSTRUCT  1.32  (1.32) 
-1.01 
 (1.62) 
%DEMOCRAT*CIVILRIGHT  -.10  (1.44) 
-1.62 
(1.24) 
%DEMOCRAT*ENVIRON  2.30***  (.68) 
1.72** 
 (.78) 
%DEMOCRAT*WHITECOL  .84**  (.36) 
-.054 
 (.33) 
Joint test of %DEMOCRAT 
Interactions 
 <.0001 <.0151 
R-Square .8550 .8554 .8596 
Crime-Specific Time Trends No No Yes 
N=365,062.  Not reported: District dummies, offense type, base offense level, criminal 
history, criminal history*base offense level, demographic characteristics. ***coefficient 
significant at less than 1% level, **coefficient significant at 5% level or less, *coefficient 
significant at 10% level or less.   
 
 Table 4 adds the political alignment variables.  We limit the sample to street 
crimes (violent, drug, and theft offenses) for which earlier results on total prison time 
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TABLE 4: FINAL OFFENSE LEVEL  
(VIOLENT, DRUG, AND THEFT OFFENSES ONLY) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
%DEMOCRATa -.48**  (.24) 
-.44* 
 (.26) 
CIRCDEM  .10  (.16) 
%DEMOCRAT*CIRCDEMb  -.067  (.29) 
R-Square .8610 . 8610 
Joint test of a & b  .1549 
N 238,229 238,229 
N=238,229.  Not reported: District dummies, offense type, base offense 
level, criminal history, criminal history*base offense level, demographic 
characteristics. ***coefficient significant at less than 1% level, 
**coefficient significant at 5% level or less, *coefficient significant at 10% 
level or less.   
 
 The %DEMOCRAT coefficient in Model 1 is negative and significant at just the 
5% level.  This suggests that for street crimes Democrat appointees calculate lower final 
offense levels -- that is, they make more downward adjustments to the base offense level 
-- than do Republican appointees.  Model 2 adds the political alignment variable 
(%DEMOCRAT*CIRCDEM).  The sign of that variable is negative and the coefficient 
estimate is very small (-.067) and not statistically significant.   It is not surprising that 
political alignment may be relatively unimportant to offense level calculations.  As 
discussed above, offense level calculations are inherently harder for circuit courts to 
review, both because of the deferential doctrine (i.e., “clearly erroneous” standard) and 
the monitoring costs to the circuit court of reviewing fact-intensive findings.  Consistent 
with our theory (Proposition B-2), political alignment does not appear to be very 
important for making adjustments to base offense levels.    
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In order to quantify the effect of adjustments to the base offense level and test 
whether political alignment matters to instrument choice, we consider the months change 
in prison sentence resulting from such adjustments by running the following regression 
using only those offenders sentenced for violent, theft, and drug offenses: 
 
                                 E%DEMOCRAT
AVAGECRIMHIST*BOLCRIMHISTBOL
θOFFTYPEsηOFFENDERDISTRICT λYEARαConstant BASECHANGE(3)










BASECHANGE is the difference between the final prison sentence (the sentence 
after all adjustments and departures have been applied) and the minimum Guidelines 
Table sentence permitted by the base offense level/criminal history combination.  In 
order to focus solely on the effect of offense level calculations, we exclude from some 
BASECHANGE analyses cases in which downward departures were granted.52  In 
Models 1 and 2 of Table 5, which include all departure cases, Democrats prefer lighter 
sentences (though the results are fairly weak).  The importance of alignment is unclear 
since the alignment coefficient is not significant.  Models 3 and 4 of Table 5 exclude 
cases in which a substantial assistance departure was granted.  A strong partisan effect is 
evident in Model 3.  In Model 4, the coefficient on %DEMOCRAT*CIRCDEM is 
insignificant and smaller than the %DEMOCRAT coefficient.  In Models 5 and 6, we 
exclude cases in which any departure was granted.  Thus, changes in prison sentences in 
these cases come entirely from offense level adjustments, and similar results are obtained. 
                                                 
52 Note that because we are measuring the change in sentence as the distance from the base offense level, 
we are implicitly conditioning on the base offense level.  As such, our coefficients represent lower bounds. 
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Overall, the %DEMOCRAT coefficients in Table 5 indicate that sentences in 
Democratic districts relative to Republican districts are seven months lighter for street 
crimes.  The coefficient on %DEMOCRAT*CIRCDEM suggests, consistent with Table 
4, that alignment is not important when sentencing differences are driven solely by 
changes in offense level calculations.  In other words, the results suggest that district 
court judges' ability to manipulate offense levels, while perhaps bounded by the 
Guidelines and the facts themselves, are not bounded by the amount of political 
alignment with the circuit court. 
 
TABLE 5: MONTHS CHANGE IN PRISON SENTENCES FROM MINIMUM BASE OFFENSE 
LEVEL SENTENCE (VIOLENT, DRUG, AND THEFT OFFENSES) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model 6 
























Joint test a & b  .0465  .0150  .001 











R-Square .5012 .5013 .5107 .5108 .5296 .5264 
N 236,368 236,368 176,093 176,093 147,589 147,589 
Not reported: District dummies, offense type, base offense level, criminal history, criminal 
history*base offense level, demographic characteristics. ***coefficient significant at less than 
1% level, **coefficient significant at 5% level or less, *coefficient significant at 10% level or 
less.   
 
 
Political Ideology, Circuit Court Alignment, and Departures We now consider whether 
Democrat-appointed district court judges grant larger downward departures from the 
recommended sentencing range for street crimes when politically aligned with the circuit 
court than when not aligned. 
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 Our dependent variable under this analysis is FINALCHANGE, which is the 
difference between the final prison sentence and the Sentencing Table minimum sentence 
permitted by the final offense level calculation (FOL).  Thus, upward departures are 
positive and downward departures are negative.  Sentences above the minimum but 
within the range are positive, while sentences at the minimum (the majority of all 
sentences) are recorded as zero. Therefore, FINALCHANGE regressions quantify the 
change in prison sentences that result from departures from the minimum Guidelines 
sentence.53   
 
                                 E%DEMOCRAT
AVAGECRIMHIST*BOLCRIMHISTBOL
θOFFTYPEsηOFFENDERDISTRICT λYEARαConstant EFINALCHANG(5)











We also estimated probits on the likelihood of a downward departure being 
granted, but failed to find any significant effects, although the coefficients were signed as 
expected and sometimes significant at the 10% level.  Schanzenbach (2005a) reports a 
similar finding.  The size of the departure will undoubtedly factor both into the abuse of 
discretion analysis and in the prosecution’s decision on whether to appeal.  It is not 
surprising therefore that we can detect partisan differences in the magnitude but not in the 
probability of a departure. 
 The results in Table 6 conform nicely to the theory’s predictions.  The partisan 
effect in Model 1, which does not consider alignment, is small and not statistically 
                                                 
53 We also estimated probits on the likelihood of a downward departure being granted, but failed to find any 
significant effects.  Schanzenbach (2005a) makes a similar finding.  As mentioned, the size of the departure 
will undoubtedly factor into the abuse of discretion analysis.  We therefore believe that it is more fruitful to 
examine the magnitude of the departure. 
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significant.  However, Model 2 suggests that political alignment between the district 
court and the circuit court must be considered.  While the coefficient on %DEMOCRAT 
remains small and insignificant, the coefficient on %DEMOCRAT*CIRCDEM is 
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TABLE 6: MONTHS CHANGE IN PRISON SENTENCES FROM MINIMUM FINAL OFFENSE LEVEL SENTENCE  
(VIOLENT, DRUG, AND THEFT OFFENSES) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
%DEMOCRATa -1.44           (2.58) 
1.03 
        (2.87) 
-3.24* 
          (1.89) 
-1.68 
        (2.23) 
-.30 
        (4.24) 
-2.45 
        (3.50) 
CIRCDEM  2.23         (1.61) 
 
 3.42* 





    
  -.34 
    
    
    
    
    
     
       
       
-7.75**
        (3.32) 
 
-6.56**
        (2.91) 
 CIRCDEM25-49%         (1.65) 
 
-.67 
        (1.11) 
CIRCDEM50-75% 3.43*         (2.57) 
 
2.21 
        (1.51) 
CIRCDEM76-100% 2.15         (3.51) 
 
3.73 




        (3.80) 
-6.92 
.85 
        (3.14) 
CIRCDEM50-75% 
* %DEMOCRATb         (5.23) 
-6.75 
-4.19 
        (3.38) 
CIRCDEM76-100% 
* %DEMOCRATb         (8.08) 
-8.34 
        (5.31) 
Joint test  a & b  .0468 .011 .0342 .0216





R-Square .3004 .3005 .3382 .3383 .3005 .3384
N 238,155 238,155 176,939 176,939 238,155 176,939
Not reported: District dummies, offense type, base offense level, criminal history, criminal history*base offense level, demographic 
characteristics. ***coefficient significant at less than 1% level, **coefficient significant at 5% level or less, *coefficient significant at 10% level 
or less.   
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 Models 3 and 4 remove substantial assistance downward departures.  These 
departures must be requested by the prosecution and are contingent on the ability of the 
defendant to provide valuable information regarding other crimes.  With substantial 
assistance departures removed, the partisan effect of Model 3 is barely significant at the 
10% level, but the partisan and alignment effects of Model 4 are jointly significant at the 
1% level (and much stronger than before).  In addition, all of the partisan effect is 
concentrated in the circuit alignment variable; there appears to be little or no effect apart 
from alignment.  Ignoring the insignificant coefficients on %DEMOCRAT and 
CIRCDEM, the coefficient on %DEMOCRAT*CIRCDEM suggests that an all 
Democrat-appointed bench in a Democrat majority circuit gives 6.5 months lower prison 
sentences due to departures relative to all other combinations.  Of course, this can be 
stated conversely as well, so that an all Republican bench in a Republican majority circuit 
gives 6.5 months higher prison sentences.  This is consistent with our instrument choice 
theory that the district court judges are deterred from making significant departures 
unless there is circuit court political alignment (Proposition B-3). 
 Our simple dummy specification for circuit court alignment provides an easy 
interpretation, but it is not an ideal proxy for what concerns the district court judge--
probability of reversal.  If we entered a percent figure for circuit judges or a numeric 
probability of drawing a majority Democratic panel, however, we would be specifying a 
a levels effect in the interaction term, which is hard to interpret.  With this in mind, 
Models 5 and 6 provide a more flexible specification and divide the circuit court 
dummies into four categories: 0-24%, 25-49%, 50-74%, and 75-100% Democratic 
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appointee, with 0 to 25% being the excluded category.  As can be seen, there is little or 
no effect of having 25-49% of the circuit as Democrats relative to 0-24%.  When we 
exclude substantial assistance departures in Model 6, the circuit alignment effects 
increase as the district and circuit become more aligned, almost doubling when we move 
from 50-74% to 75-100%.  This is precisely what we would expect to observe. 
In sum, it is difficult for the judge to depart significantly from the Guidelines 
unless there is circuit alignment.  Since upward departures are so rare, it is unlikely that 
the effects are being driven much by Republican alignments.  Rather, Democrat district 
court judges in Democrat circuits are granting larger downward departures for street 
crimes.54   
 
 IV. Conclusion 
 The theoretical and empirical analyses presented here lead to three important 
conclusions.  First, Democrat and Republican appointees prefer different sentences for 
different crimes.  Even in the constraining framework of the Sentencing Guidelines, the 
judge’s preferences matter.  Sizeable partisan effects were evident throughout and were 
fairly consistent: Democrat appointees favored lighter sentences than Republican 
appointees for drug trafficking, theft, and violent offenses.   Democrat appointees also 
calculated higher offense levels than Republican appointees for white collar and 
environmental crimes, but we could not detect any resulting differences in prison time for 
                                                 
54 As a final note, there are times when mandatory minimum sentences may trump the minimum Guidelines 
sentence, although in drug cases judges can often override the minimum sentences.  We performed an 
analysis in which we measured changes in sentences from binding mandatory minimums instead of 
Guidelines minimums, and reach similar conclusions to those presented here.  This result is not too 
surprising.  As pointed out by Bowman and Heise (2002), mandatory minimums are not often binding, and 
when they are they generally do not change the minimum sentence greatly.  Also, under U.S.S.G. §5C1.2, 
judges may make findings of fact to void mandatory minimums in drug cases.  Of course, mandatory 
minimums do not prevent upward adjustments from enhancing the sentence.       
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these crimes (likely because of a smaller impact of offense level changes in these areas 
and smaller sample sizes).  In addition, we found evidence of secular trends in white 
collar sentencing that may confound the estimate of partisan effects.   
Second, judges mask their sentencing discretion through the calculation of the 
final offense level.  While prison sentence regressions conditioned on the final offense 
level failed to reveal a significant partisan effect in sentencing, large and statistically 
significant partisan effects were evident when we condition on base offense level -- the 
condition under which the manipulation of offense level adjustments could be measured.   
The use of the departure instrument to shorten or lengthen prison terms was more 
dependent upon political context than the use of adjustments.  Specifically, how judges 
expressed sentencing preferences depended on the political alignment between the district 
and circuit courts.  In Democrat circuits, Democrat-appointed district court judges gave 
larger downward departures than when under Republican circuits.  In fact, when we 
considered changes in prison sentences relative to the final calculated offense level, 
partisan effects were only measurable in districts that were aligned.   
A final, important normative point should be made.  While our work finds 
substantial differences between Democrat and Republican-appointed district court judges, 
our work also suggests that the sentencing reforms -- the promulgation of the Sentencing 
Guidelines and appellate review of district court sentencing decisions -- have served an 
important role in constraining judges’ sentencing practices.  Prior to the sentencing 
reforms, district court judges had great discretion over sentencing and, without appellate 
review, no one to rein in that discretion.  Essentially, district court judges acted as if the 
circuit court was ideologically aligned as no discipline was likely to come.  Our finding 
 44
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art1
May 23, 2005 
 
that alignment between district and appellate courts affects the sentencing judge's 
behavior regarding departures suggests that sentencing reforms may have reduced the 
overall discretion of district court judges, at least when those judges were overseen by a 
circuit with different political-ideological preferences.  Moreover, the Guidelines, by 
setting out a recommended sentencing range, and then listing the acceptable factual 
circumstances for which an adjustment could be made, helped to limit the district court's 
options.  It created a new fact (adjustment) versus law (departure) classification which 
pushed a large set of case circumstances (factors outside the heartland of the Guidelines) 
into stricter review conditions.   There can be little doubt, then, that a return to a system 
of absolute discretion for district court judges within broad statutory boundaries and no 
appellate review would increase sentencing disparities. 
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APPENDIX 1: SENTENCING TABLE 
(in months of imprisonment) 
 




(0 or 1) 
II 
(2 or 3) 
III 
(4, 5, 6) 
IV 
(7, 8, 9) 
V 
(10, 11, 12) 
VI 
(13 or more) 
 1 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 
 2 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 1-7 
 3 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 3-9 
        
 4 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 4-10 6-12 
Zone A 5 0-6 0-6 1-7 4-10 6-12 9-15 
 6 0-6 1-7 2-8 6-12 9-15 12-18 
        
 7 0-6 2-8 4-10 8-14 12-18 15-21 
 8 0-6 4-10 6-12 10-16 15-21 18-24 
 9 4-10 6-12 8-14 12-18 18-24 21-27 
Zone B        
 10 6-12 8-14 10-16 15-21 21-27 24-30 
Zone C 11 8-14 10-16 12-18 18-24 24-30 27-33 
 12 10-16 12-18 15-21 21-27 27-33 30-37 
        
 13 12-18 15-21 18-24 24-30 30-37 33-41 
 14 15-21 18-24 21-27 27-33 33-41 37-46 
 15 18-24 21-27 24-30 30-37 37-46 41-51 
        
 16 21-27 24-30 27-33 33-41 41-51 46-57 
 17 24-30 27-33 30-37 37-46 46-57 51-63 
 18 27-33 30-37 33-41 41-51 51-63 57-71 
        
 19 30-37 33-41 37-46 46-57 57-71 63-78 
 20 33-41 37-46 41-51 51-63 63-78 70-87 
 21 37-46 41-51 46-57 57-71 70-87 77-96 
        
 22 41-51 46-57 51-63 63-78 77-96 84-105 
 23 46-57 51-63 57-71 70-87 84-105 92-115 
 24 51-63 57-71 63-78 77-96 92-115 100-125 
        
 25 57-71 63-78 70-87 84-105 100-125 110-137 
 26 63-78 70-87 78-97 92-115 110-137 120-150 
 27 70-87 78-97 87-108 100-125 120-150 130-162 
Zone D        
 28 78-97 87-108 97-121 110-137 130-162 140-175 
 29 87-108 97-121 108-135 121-151 140-175 151-188 
 30 97-121 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 
        
 31 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 
 32 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 
 33 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 
        
 34 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 
 35 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 
 36 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 
        
 37 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 
 38 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 
 39 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 
        
 40 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 
 41 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 
 42 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 
 43 Life Life Life Life life Life 
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 Table 1a:  Means and Proportions (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Variable Mean or Proportion Sentenced 
Offenders in Sample 
























Base Offense Level 18.79 
(10.82) 
Final Offense Level  19.02 
(9.36) 
Average Offense Level 
Adjustment From Base Level  
.22 
(5.06) 












































































N  365,066 
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